What the rise of prediction markets reveals about financial innovation, institutional capital, market infrastructure and regulation, and the lessons the industry can learn from cryptocurrency.
There is something familiar about the current excitement surrounding prediction markets.
A few years ago, cryptocurrency was associated largely with a small community of technology enthusiasts, traders and early adopters.
Today it is an industry that attracts institutional investors, traditional financial institutions, regulators and technology companies. Its growth has also exposed difficult questions about market infrastructure, investor protection, regulation and the limits of financial innovation.
Prediction markets appear to be approaching a similar moment.
What began largely as a way to speculate on sporting outcomes has expanded into a market where participants can trade on political developments, economic indicators, financial events, cryptocurrency prices and cultural outcomes. Technology has made these markets more accessible, while institutional interest is changing how they are perceived and built.
These developments featured in the discussions at the NEXTPredict Summit New York 2026, which brought together industry participants to examine the commercial, technological and regulatory future of prediction markets.
I am grateful to Stuart Crowley for the invitation and ticket. Travelling to New York was not feasible, so I followed the sessions remotely through the recordings made available on YouTube.
Watch the summit discussions: Here
Several conversations raised questions that reach beyond the immediate growth of the industry: the financial infrastructure needed to sustain it, the role of institutional capital, the regulatory framework for event contracts, the risks of insider trading and market manipulation, and, most importantly, whether greater participation will improve or undermine the accuracy of predictions.
Having followed the development of cryptocurrency markets and their regulation, I found several parallels particularly instructive. The comparison is not simply that both industries have grown quickly. Both are trying to establish new forms of financial participation while confronting the institutional, regulatory and infrastructural demands of a mature market.
This article examines those parallels and considers what prediction markets can learn from crypto, including the mistakes they should avoid repeating.
1. Prediction Markets Are Having Their Crypto Moment
The behaviour underlying prediction markets is not new. People have long wagered on sporting outcomes, political developments and other uncertain events, and sports betting has built a familiar commercial model around anticipating future outcomes.
What is changing is the technology, accessibility and breadth of the products on offer. Digital platforms have transformed how participants discover contracts, take positions and monitor prices. What was once associated with conventional betting is increasingly presented through exchange-based products that resemble financial trading.
The market has also moved beyond sports. Participants can now find contracts relating to:
Elections, appointments and government decisions.Financial indicators, interest rates and economic developments.Cryptocurrency prices and blockchain-related events.Corporate announcements and business developments.Culture, entertainment and public figures.Sporting competitions and individual match outcomes.
This expansion matters because it changes the commercial identity of the industry.
A market limited to sporting wagers is easily associated with the existing betting industry.
A market in which participants take positions on inflation, monetary policy, corporate developments or geopolitical events raises different questions about speculation, hedging and information-based trading.
Crypto offers a useful comparison.
Bitcoin existed long before the broader ecosystem we recognise today. Exchanges, wallets, decentralised protocols, stablecoins and tokenisation created new ways to participate. The expansion was not simply about more people buying Bitcoin; it was about new products, infrastructure and commercial relationships built around digital assets. Prediction markets are undergoing a comparable expansion.
There is, however, an important distinction. Cryptocurrency markets generally involve trading assets, whereas prediction markets involve trading contracts whose value depends on whether a defined event occurs.
That difference affects valuation, settlement, regulation and risk management. A prediction market needs more than willing traders. It needs a credible mechanism for determining what actually happened and resolving contracts accordingly.
The central question is therefore:
Whether prediction markets move beyond their historical association with betting and become credible financial market infrastructure?
2. From Sports Betting to Financial Markets: Where Is the Commercial Opportunity?
Sports remains a major part of the prediction market economy, offering familiar events, established audiences and frequent opportunities to trade. The commercial opportunity broadens considerably, however, once markets extend beyond sport.
Consider a participant who wants exposure to the possibility that a central bank will raise interest rates, that a company will announce a particular development, or that a cryptocurrency will reach a specified price by a given date.
These are not necessarily betting motivations. They can reflect a wish to express a view on an economic or financial outcome.
This is where prediction markets attract the attention of financial institutions and hedge funds. For institutional investors, event contracts could offer exposure to outcomes that are difficult to express through conventional instruments.
They may be useful for:
Speculating on economic and political developments.Managing exposure to specific events.Hedging risks arising from business operations.Expressing views not easily captured by traditional assets.Complementing existing derivatives and investment strategies.
The use of prediction markets for risk management is particularly interesting.
A business exposed to a regulatory decision, a commodity-price threshold or a geopolitical development could, in principle, use an appropriately structured event contract as a hedge.
This invites comparison with insurance.
Traditional insurance transfers specified risks in exchange for a premium, subject to contractual conditions and the insurer’s obligations. A prediction market offers a different mechanism, in which participants take opposing financial positions on whether a defined event occurs. One could describe the opportunity as event-based risk transfer.
Event contracts should not, however, be treated as insurance products by default. Their legal classification, payout structure, counterparty arrangements and regulatory treatment may differ substantially.
The question raised at the summit remains straightforward:
Is there currently enough volume outside sports and politics to support long-term institutional investment by firms with substantial capital?
The answer should be approached cautiously.
An interesting event does not automatically create a viable market. Institutions need sufficient volume, reliable settlement, predictable transaction costs and the ability to enter or exit positions without moving prices. A market can have a compelling proposition and still lack the depth to absorb large allocations. The gap between commercial potential and actual market capacity will be central to the industry’s development.
3. Wall Street Is Arriving, but Capital Efficiency Matters
Institutional interest is one of the clearest signs that prediction markets are moving beyond their original audience. Traditional financial firms, hedge funds, market makers and established sports betting operators are all examining the opportunity.
DraftKings is a useful example.
In October 2025 it acquired Railbird Technologies and its CFTC-designated exchange subsidiary as part of its entry into prediction markets, and in June 2026 it launched its proprietary exchange, DKeX, integrating prediction markets into its consumer platform. The move shows that established operators want more than another product. They want the underlying exchange infrastructure, the customer relationships and the operating economics.
Institutional capital can bring real benefits. Institutional participants can add liquidity, making it easier to enter and exit positions. Professional market makers can narrow bid-ask spreads and improve the availability of contracts. Hedge funds can contribute analytical capability, specialised information and trading strategies that may improve price discovery.
Institutional participation also raises the question of opportunity cost.
Capital committed to a prediction market cannot be deployed elsewhere. If a fund can earn a better risk-adjusted return in equities, bonds, commodities or derivatives, it needs a compelling reason to allocate to event contracts. That reason is harder to find where liquidity is thin, settlement arrangements are uncertain, or capital remains tied up until an event resolves.
The industry therefore cannot rely on attracting institutions alone. It must make the economics of participation attractive. Liquidity, capital efficiency, market depth and reliable settlement are not secondary considerations; they are preconditions for institutional adoption.
4. The Infrastructure Problem: What Does a 24/7 Market Require?
One of the more instructive parallels with crypto is the expectation of continuous trading. Crypto markets operate around the clock, including weekends and public holidays. Prediction markets increasingly operate with the same expectation, and for good reason: a political announcement, corporate development or geopolitical event does not wait for traditional markets to reopen.
If participants are expected to trade continuously, the supporting financial infrastructure must keep pace.
The weekend liquidity problem.
Consider a participant who must post additional margin after an adverse price movement on a Saturday. Moving funds through conventional banking channels may be difficult or impossible. The market remains open, but the financial system behind it does not. This mismatch between trading availability and funding availability means platforms need infrastructure that supports collateral movements, margin and settlement outside banking hours.
Margin and capital requirements.
Margin determines how participants meet their obligations and how exchanges manage exposure. In a 24/7 environment it raises questions about the timing of margin calls, the availability of eligible collateral and the consequences of failing to meet a call outside banking hours. A platform cannot adopt continuous trading without ensuring that its risk-management framework operates continuously too.
Settlement
Prediction markets depend on a defined event and an agreed mechanism for determining the outcome. A platform must establish:
What event triggers settlement.Which information source determines the outcome.How conflicting or incomplete information is treated.What happens if an event is cancelled, postponed or disputed.How participants receive their payouts.How settlement disputes are resolved.
These issues become more complex where platforms operate across jurisdictions or use different financial and blockchain infrastructures.
Fragmentation.
Different platforms may use different collateral arrangements, payment systems, clearing structures, settlement mechanisms and market rules, which makes it harder for capital to move efficiently between markets. Crypto encountered the same problem as exchanges, blockchains, wallets and stablecoin networks multiplied. The industry responded by exploring interoperability, improved custody and more efficient settlement. Prediction markets will need to solve their own version of this problem.
The CFTC’s May 2026 staff advisory on 24/7 trading, clearing and settlement is directly relevant. It acknowledges the growing interest in continuous trading while reminding regulated participants that extending trading hours does not remove their existing clearing, settlement and risk-management obligations.
The lesson is straightforward: continuous trading requires continuous financial infrastructure.
5. The Regulatory Question: Where Do Prediction Markets Belong?
The regulatory position is one of the most consequential issues facing the industry. In the United States, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) plays a central role in regulating event contracts offered through designated contract markets, and the Commodity Exchange Act provides the framework under which these products may be treated as derivatives or swaps, depending on their structure.
The classification of prediction markets has nevertheless become contested, particularly for sports-related contracts.
The question is whether these products are financial derivatives regulated under federal commodities law or gambling products subject to state sports betting laws.
A platform operating as a CFTC-regulated exchange may argue that its event contracts fall within the federal derivatives framework. State gaming regulators may argue that contracts on sporting outcomes are functionally sports wagers and must comply with state gambling legislation.
The dispute has produced litigation involving the CFTC, prediction market operators and several states. In April 2026, the CFTC sued New York, seeking to prevent the state from applying its gambling laws to CFTC-registered contract markets. In September 2026, New Jersey petitioned the US Supreme Court to review the federal-state jurisdictional dispute over sports-related prediction markets.
As at November 2026, this remains a pending legal controversy. There is no Supreme Court decision affirming exclusive CFTC jurisdiction over every prediction market. The CFTC’s authority over regulated derivatives markets is established, but the extent to which that framework displaces state gambling regulation for particular sports contracts is still contested. It is one of the most important legal questions the industry must resolve.
Beyond jurisdiction lies market integrity.
The CFTC is responsible for preventing fraud, abusive trading practices and manipulation in markets under its authority. This is especially important for prediction markets, because their prices are meant to communicate information about the likelihood of future events. If prices can be manipulated, or if participants can trade on improperly obtained confidential information, the market’s usefulness collapses.
The challenge is therefore not only deciding who regulates prediction markets, but establishing how rules on market conduct should apply to these new products.
6. Insider Trading and Market Manipulation: The New Enforcement Frontier
A common misconception holds that because prediction markets concern future events rather than conventional securities, participants may trade on any information they hold. That assumption is dangerous.
The Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations contain anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions that can apply to event contracts, and the precise legal basis depends on the contract, the conduct and the duties involved.
Three enforcement developments illustrate the point.
The Maduro case: confidential government information. In April 2026, the CFTC brought an enforcement action against Gannon Ken Van Dyke, an active-duty US Army servicemember. The complaint alleged that he used sensitive, nonpublic information about the US military operation to capture former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to trade on Polymarket. According to the CFTC, Van Dyke participated in planning and executing the operation and then bought more than 436,000 shares in a contract on Maduro’s removal from power, generating more than $404,000 in profit. The US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced a parallel criminal action.
The case shows how information obtained through government service can create an unfair advantage in an event contract.
The underlying concern is a breach of a duty of trust and confidentiality. Someone entrusted with sensitive information cannot convert it into a personal financial opportunity, and the fact that the trade occurs on a prediction market does not remove the legal consequences.
The Google case: corporate confidential information. In May 2026, the CFTC filed a complaint against Michele Spagnuolo, a Google employee, alleging that he used confidential information about Google’s official Year in Search rankings to trade on Polymarket. The complaint alleges that he used access obtained through his employment to place trades on at least 23 contracts, generating approximately $1.2 million in profit. A parallel criminal complaint was announced by the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
This case adds a corporate dimension. An employee’s duty to protect confidential company information does not disappear because the information concerns search rankings rather than a conventional financial announcement. The central issue is the unauthorised use of information obtained through a relationship of trust and confidence for personal gain. It also shows that insider trading concerns reach well beyond traditional securities markets.
The George Santos case: influencing the event itself. In July 2026, the CFTC entered a settlement order with former US Congressman George Santos concerning a contract on whether he would attend the State of the Union address. Santos traded on the contract while making public statements about his attendance. The CFTC found that those statements contained material misrepresentations and omissions that moved the contract’s price in a way that favoured his positions. The order required him to disgorge approximately $17,570 in profits, pay a $17,500 civil monetary penalty and accept a three-year trading ban.
This is not a conventional insider trading case. Santos was not accused of exploiting confidential information obtained from someone else. He was in a position to influence the underlying event and to make public statements capable of moving the price. It illustrates a distinct form of market abuse: manipulating expectations through misleading representations.
Together, these cases show that prediction markets sit within the reach of existing market integrity rules.
What constitutes the breach?
It is useful to distinguish three categories of conduct:
Misappropriation of material nonpublic information: using confidential information obtained through a duty of trust or confidence for personal gain, where the relevant law prohibits that use.Market manipulation: deceptive conduct designed to create artificial supply, demand or price movements.Fraudulent misrepresentation: knowingly or recklessly making misleading statements or omissions that influence participants or prices, where the applicable anti-fraud provisions are engaged.
These categories can overlap, but they are not interchangeable. Not every profitable trade based on superior information is unlawful, and not every unusual price movement amounts to manipulation. The analysis must identify the applicable duty, the prohibited conduct, the relevant contract and the statutory provisions engaged.
The distinction matters because prediction markets depend on participants trading on information. If all information-based trading were prohibited, the market’s capacity to aggregate information would be destroyed.
The regulatory task is to separate legitimate research and analysis from the misuse of confidential information, fraud and deliberate manipulation.
7. Market Surveillance: Can Suspicious Trading Be Detected Before It Causes Damage?
The enforcement cases raise a practical question about how can platforms identify suspicious activity before, or shortly after, it occurs.
Traditional markets use surveillance systems to monitor trading patterns, unusual orders, price movements, and relationships between accounts. Prediction markets need comparable mechanisms. The summit highlighted several layers.
Identity verification and KYC.
Know Your Customer procedures help platforms identify participants and recognise categories that may present heightened risk, such as political figures, campaign personnel, government employees or individuals with access to confidential corporate information. Third-party verification and screening providers can assist. But identity verification is only a starting point: knowing who is trading does not reveal whether that person is using information they are prohibited from using.
Behavioural analysis.
Platforms can monitor patterns that depart from ordinary behaviour, such as an account that repeatedly takes unusually large positions shortly before important events, achieves improbable results, or trades in ways inconsistent with public information. A 95% win rate across a series of contracts, for example, may justify investigation. It is not automatic proof of insider trading, since a trader may have a legitimate informational edge, a specialised forecasting model or simply a favourable run. The objective of surveillance is to identify anomalies that warrant investigation, not to presume wrongdoing from profitability alone.
On-chain analytics.
Where trading occurs on-chain, transactions can be publicly examined, and investigators may be able to trace wallet funding, transaction histories and relationships between addresses. Multiple wallets funded from a common source and entering similar positions just before an event, for example, may warrant closer scrutiny. But public blockchain data does not by itself reveal the real-world identity or motive of a wallet holder. On-chain transparency is a valuable investigative resource, not a substitute for identity verification, transaction monitoring, and legal investigation.
Regulatory collaboration and reporting.
Market operators may work with bodies such as the National Futures Association (NFA) and specialist compliance providers to support monitoring, reporting and oversight.
The summit referred to T+1 surveillance practices, under which relevant trading activity is reviewed within a defined post-trade cycle. Where potential violations are identified, platforms may refer matters to the CFTC or the Department of Justice.
This reflects an important institutional distinction.
The CFTC is a civil regulatory and enforcement agency, while criminal prosecution is a matter for the Department of Justice. The Maduro and Google matters show both pursuing parallel actions arising from the same alleged conduct. The industry therefore needs surveillance systems that support not only internal platform rules but also meaningful cooperation with regulators and law enforcement.
8. Retail or Institutional? Who Is the Market Really Being Built For?
Another question raised at the summit was whether prediction markets will become retail products, institutional products or both. The answer is likely both, but the expectations differ.
Retail participants are drawn by accessibility, simplicity and the ability to express a view on familiar events such as a football match, an election or a cryptocurrency price. For them, the platform experience matters. They need to understand what they are buying, how the contract works, what determines settlement and what happens if the event does not unfold as expected.
Institutional participants look at liquidity, execution quality, capital requirements, settlement certainty, counterparty exposure and the legal enforceability of their positions. An institution may find a contract attractive for the economic exposure it offers, yet stay away if the market cannot accommodate the position size it needs.
The two groups complement each other.
Retail participation brings activity and diversity of opinion; institutional participation brings capital, liquidity, and professional market-making. These interests have to be balanced.
The importance of trust.
In retail-facing markets, trust is fundamental. Participants must understand what they may trade, what information is available, how prices are formed and how positions will be settled. Retail users often lack the resources to assess a platform’s internal systems or the credibility of its resolution process, so they depend more heavily on disclosures, governance and operational integrity.
Institutional counterparties typically have more sophisticated contracts, compliance systems and due diligence. Transparency is therefore not a marketing feature; it is part of the infrastructure that sustains participation.
Hedging and risk management.
Both groups need ways to manage exposure. Institutions may use event contracts alongside other instruments to hedge. Retail users need simpler ways to understand their maximum potential loss, the effect of changing prices and the consequences of holding a contract to settlement. The industry should not assume that one product structure will suit every category of participant.
9. The Gambling Question: What Happens When Only a Few Participants Win?
The comparison with sports betting is hard to avoid. Even as prediction markets expand into financial and political events, their business models may attract scrutiny because of their similarity to gambling. That raises questions about advertising, consumer protection and the social consequences of participation.
One concern is the possibility of highly unequal outcomes, with a small number of participants capturing substantial profits while many others lose. That is not unusual in financial markets, where risk appetite, information advantages and outcomes vary widely. But when products are marketed to retail users as entertainment, the line between financial participation and gambling becomes harder to draw.
Platforms have a responsibility to ensure that consumers understand the risks. The industry will have to consider how its spending on customer acquisition sits alongside the commercial and social consequences of encouraging continuous participation. Aggressive advertising, exaggerated claims about returns and the presentation of speculative contracts as easy money can erode public confidence.
The questions that have confronted the sports betting industry will therefore remain relevant. Prediction markets do have an opportunity to draw clearer distinctions between recreational participation and financially motivated trading, but that will depend on how platforms structure products, communicate risk and treat customers. For retail participation to be sustainable, users must understand that an event contract is a financial position with a defined risk, not a guarantee of what will happen.
10. The Accuracy Problem: Does More Money Make a Prediction Market More Reliable?
Perhaps the most intellectually interesting discussion at the summit concerned predictive accuracy.
Prediction markets are often associated with the wisdom of crowds: when people with different information and perspectives trade together, their combined activity can yield a more accurate estimate of an event’s probability.
A contract trading at 70 cents, for example, may be read as the market assigning roughly a 70% probability to the event, assuming a standard binary contract with a one-dollar payout and sound market conditions. Rather than relying on a single analyst or forecasting institution, the market aggregates many views through trading.
That assumption becomes more complicated as the market grows.
More participants do not necessarily mean better information. Higher volume can improve liquidity and accessibility, but it does not necessarily improve the quality of information reflected in prices. New entrants with less specialised knowledge may increase diversity while lowering average expertise. This is not inherently a problem, since participants need not be experts to contribute.
The difficulty arises when trading is driven mainly by speculation, popularity or misinformation rather than an assessment of the underlying event. A market can become more active without becoming more accurate.
The problem of uninformed capital.
The final panel raised concerns about the arrival of so-called dumb money: capital entering a market without the research, information or analytical capability of experienced participants.
It can increase volume and create opportunities for others, but it creates a tension. If large amounts of less informed capital enter, sophisticated traders may find it easier to profit from information asymmetry, producing greater liquidity without a corresponding improvement in accuracy.
This raises an uncomfortable question about whether prediction market become commercially successful while becoming less reliable as a forecasting mechanism?
When capital becomes a tool for influencing perception. A participant with substantial capital may try to move a contract’s price to shape public perception of an event.
The aim is not necessarily to express a genuine probability but to create the impression that an outcome is becoming more likely. This is especially sensitive in political markets, where publicly visible prices can influence media narratives and public expectations.
A market price is not merely a private financial signal; it can become part of the information environment surrounding the event.
This creates a potential feedback loop. Participants see a price move and read it as evidence that an outcome is becoming more likely; that perception attracts further trading and moves the price again. The market may end up influencing the very expectations it is meant to measure.
Information asymmetry: problem and opportunity.
Information asymmetry is not wholly negative. Prediction markets depend on participants holding different information and analytical capabilities, and a person with specialised knowledge may spot an outcome the wider market has overlooked. That is part of price discovery. The difficulty lies in distinguishing legitimate informational advantages from the exploitation of confidential information or the deliberate distortion of prices.
The Maduro and Google cases illustrate the legal risks of misappropriating protected information. The challenge is to preserve the advantages that make markets useful while preventing participants from exploiting information they are legally or contractually barred from using.
Subsidising professional market makers.
One proposal at the final panel was to place greater emphasis on subsidising professional market makers, particularly in specialised, high-value markets. This is an important suggestion. Rather than relying solely on growing the retail base, platforms could invest in market makers able to support liquidity in contracts that demand deeper research. Professional market makers can improve execution, maintain tighter spreads and support continuous trading. Incentives must nonetheless be structured carefully. A market maker’s role is to provide liquidity, not to guarantee that the market reaches the correct prediction, and subsidies should reward genuine liquidity provision rather than artificial volume.
Ultimately, the credibility of a prediction market depends on the quality of the information in its prices. Liquidity is necessary, but it is not sufficient.
11. What Prediction Markets Can Learn from Crypto
The crypto industry has already confronted many of the structural questions now emerging in prediction markets: rapid adoption, institutional entry, fragmented infrastructure, regulatory uncertainty, market manipulation and recurring questions of consumer trust.
Five lessons stand out.
First, regulatory clarity takes time, but uncertainty has a cost.
Crypto spent years navigating the classification of digital assets and the regulation of exchanges, custody, stablecoins and decentralised finance. Prediction markets now face their own classification question. The distinction between a financial derivative and a gambling product is not academic: it determines licensing, supervision, permissible activities and the protections available to participants. Regulatory clarity does not mean removing all restrictions. It means establishing rules that participants can understand and operate within.
Second, technology must be supported by financial infrastructure.
Crypto showed that technological innovation can outpace the institutions that support it. Moving digital assets around the clock did not automatically solve banking access, custody, liquidity, settlement or compliance. Continuous trading requires continuous funding arrangements, appropriate margin systems, reliable settlement and effective risk management.
Third, institutional capital needs a credible market.
The arrival of institutions does not establish market maturity. They require reliable infrastructure, sufficient depth, predictable rules and effective risk controls, and the industry must build those conditions rather than assume institutional participation will create them.
Fourth, transparency must extend beyond the technology.
Blockchain transparency can provide useful evidence of transactions and wallet activity, but transparent transactions do not guarantee fair markets. Participants also need clear contract terms, reliable resolution mechanisms, meaningful disclosures and accessible dispute procedures. Trust is built through the whole market structure, not the underlying technology alone.
Fifth, growth should not be the only measure of success.
Crypto has shown that rising trading volume, market capitalisation and user numbers do not necessarily indicate the quality or sustainability of a market. A prediction market that grows rapidly but fails to protect participants, resolve contracts fairly or preserve the integrity of prices may undermine the very confidence its expansion depends on. Success should be measured not only by the capital flowing through platforms but by the reliability of the markets they create.
12. What Will It Take for Prediction Markets to Become Mainstream?
The path to mainstream adoption requires more than attracting users. It requires progress across several connected areas:
Regulatory clarity: participants need to understand the legal status of products, the responsibilities of operators and the protections available to consumers.Financial infrastructure: reliable collateral, payment, clearing and settlement arrangements that can support the platform’s trading hours.Liquidity and capital efficiency: the ability to enter and exit positions at reasonable cost without excessive market impact.Market integrity: investment in surveillance, identity verification, fraud prevention and mechanisms for addressing manipulation and insider trading.Consumer trust: clear contract terms, transparent pricing, understandable risk disclosures and reliable settlement.Predictive credibility: preserving the quality of information in prices as participation and volume grow.
Time will matter too. Crypto did not reach its present form overnight; its evolution involved technological improvement, regulatory development, institutional experimentation and repeated reassessment of how digital assets should be used. Prediction markets will need a similar period of development, and the industry should not confuse the speed of adoption with the maturity of its market structure.
My Conclusion: The Next Market Must Be Built on More Than Predictions
The NEXTPredict Summit reinforced one important point: that prediction markets are becoming more than a way to speculate on sporting and political outcomes. They are developing into an ecosystem of exchanges, market makers, institutional investors, technology providers, regulators, and retail participants, with potential applications in financial markets, business risk management, and the trading of information about future events.
The opportunities come with significant responsibilities. The industry must resolve questions of regulatory jurisdiction, market integrity, continuous trading infrastructure, capital efficiency, consumer protection and settlement. It must also confront a more fundamental challenge: ensuring that greater participation does not come at the expense of predictive credibility.
Cryptocurrency is a useful reference point.
It showed how technology can accelerate the creation of new financial markets and draw in capital from people who previously had little exposure to them. It also showed that adoption alone does not resolve questions of governance, regulation, infrastructure and trust.
Prediction markets can learn from that experience. Their long-term value will depend not on how many people trade or how much money enters, but on whether participants can trust the contracts, the infrastructure, the settlement process and the information reflected in prices. A prediction market should be judged not by how much activity it generates, but by how reliably it turns dispersed information into meaningful expectations about the future.
That is the difference between a market that attracts attention and one that earns lasting credibility.
Acknowledgement: My thanks to Stuart Crowley for the invitation and ticket to the NEXTPredict Summit NYC 2026, and to the NEXTPredict team for making the discussions accessible beyond the physical event. Although I could not travel to New York, following the sessions allowed me to engage with the industry’s current debates and consider their wider implications.
Disclaimer: This article is for general information and commentary only and does not constitute legal or financial advice.
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Prediction Markets Are Having Their Crypto Moment. What comes next? was originally published in Coinmonks on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.
